

OGC Has Reviewed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Rehnquist  
Chairman, Security Review Committee

SUBJECT : Safeguarding Official Information in the  
Interest of the Defense of the United  
States (Executive Order 10501, as  
amended)

1. This memorandum is in response to your request made during our last meeting for appropriate substitute wording of paragraph b. of the "Special Categories" section of our current draft (page 15).

2. Following your request, I have consulted with people directly concerned with conducting intelligence operations abroad and the producers of finished intelligence within the Central Intelligence Agency. I have also consulted with members of the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

3. Those persons involved with intelligence operations were particularly emphatic on having information excluded from automatic declassification if it pertains to intelligence sources and methods. Since sensitive intelligence has a direct counter-intelligence relationship to sources and methods, there is the broadest concurrence that it should remain carved out of automatic downgrading procedures.

4. Upon narrowing these considerations against the statutory requirement for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following wording is suggested as a substitute for "intelligence" as used in paragraph b. of the draft:

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
"sensitive intelligence and information involving intelligence sources and methods."

For your convenience, a new page 15 incorporating the change is attached.

5. The term "sensitive intelligence" was at one time in the draft Definition of Terms. It was later removed in favor of a definition for "sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Now that it is being reintroduced, the following definition for sensitive intelligence, taken from DCID No. 1/7, dated 5 October 1970, should be added:

"Sensitive Intelligence: Sensitive intelligence information is that classified intelligence, the unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to counteraction (a) jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources and methods which provide information vital to the national security or (b) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security."

For convenience, I am attaching a new page 3.



CIA Member

STAT

Attachments:

New Page 15

New Page 3 (Definition of Terms)

cc: Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr. - AEC  
Mr. Joseph J. Liebling - Defense  
Mr. William D. Blair, Jr. - State  
Mr. Thomas K. Latimer - NSC

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NEW 15  
8/19/71

determined, the initial starting date of which shall be the date of the new medium.

(b) Special Categories:

(1) Classified information determined to fall within the following categories may warrant some degree of classification for an indefinite period and, therefore, is excluded from the provisions of Section 4 (a), above.

a. Information originated by foreign governments or international organizations and over which the United States Government has no final classification jurisdiction.

b. Information specifically covered by statute, such as the Atomic Energy Act and information or material requiring special handling such as cryptography, sensitive intelligence and information involving intelligence sources and methods.

c. Information which is identified in writing by the head of a department or agency or his designee as extremely sensitive in the sense that for a period of indefinite duration its unauthorized disclosure would place in immediate jeopardy a person, system, plan, program, installation or method of operation the continuing protection of which is required in the interest of national defense or political-military information which concerns or affects the formulation and conduct of United States foreign policy and plans and programs relating

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Restricted Data: All data (information) concerning (1) design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but not to include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Security Clearance: A certification issued by appropriate authority to indicate that a person has been investigated and is eligible for access to classified matter to the extent stated in the certification.

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods: Sensitive intelligence sources and methods are those which produce classified intelligence the unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to counteraction (a) jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources and methods which provide information vital to the national security or (b) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security.

Sensitive Intelligence: Sensitive intelligence information is that classified intelligence, the unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to counteraction (a) jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources and methods which provide information vital to the national security or (b) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security.


NEW 3  
8/19/71

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SUBJECT: Safeguarding Official Information in the Interest of  
the Defense of the United States (Executive Order  
10501, as amended)

CONCURRENCES:

STAT



Lawrence R. Houston  
General Counsel

19 Aug 1971  
Date

STAT



John W. Colley  
Deputy Director  
for Support

19 August 1971  
Date

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Rehnquist  
Chairman, Security Review Committee

SUBJECT : Safeguarding Official Information in the  
Interests of the Defense of the United  
States (Executive Order 10501, as  
amended)

1. Pursuant to your request, we have reviewed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) paper captioned "Actions to Patently Indicate Objective of Preventing Excessive Classification" and submit the following comments.

2. From a legal point of view we believe that the revisions proposed by our Office of General Counsel (as set forth in our memorandum dated 20 August 1971 in reply to your 5 August 1971 paper) would meet many of the AEC's basic objectives. Furthermore, by the gradation of offenses there is eliminated one of their concerns that sanctions for misuse of confidential information presently come under the Espionage Laws. In the proposed revision this is no longer the case. There are specific sections dealing with mishandling of information which are separate from the sections dealing with espionage.

3. In addition to the legal aspects of one of the AEC proposals, it is our view that the elimination of CONFIDENTIAL as a defense and foreign relations classification would degrade the SECRET category in that an original classifier would be faced, in many cases, with either not classifying a document or placing it in the SECRET category. In most cases, we feel, he would classify it SECRET thus devaluating the concept of SECRET which should be maintained. Moreover, there would always be a risk that some data which should be protected might not be with a deleterious effect on our national defense and/or foreign relations interests.

4. AEC's other proposal to recast the CONFIDENTIAL level of classification from "the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the national security interests of the nation" to "the unauthorized disclosure of which would normally be expected to cause serious harm to the national defense of the U. S. or its conduct of foreign relations," seems to us to draw too fine a line between CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET. Since "grave" and "serious" are synonymous the only difference between SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL in the AEC proposal is as follows: In the SECRET category the unauthorized disclosure "would cause grave harm to the nation" while in the CONFIDENTIAL category unauthorized disclosure "would normally be expected to cause serious harm to the nation." The degree of harm would be identical in both. We believe that most classifiers would have difficulty making a judgment between SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL under this proposal. Moreover it has been suggested that penalties and sanctions for the unauthorized disclosure of CONFIDENTIAL data be relatively light as compared to those for TOP SECRET and SECRET. Under the AEC proposal, although the degree of damage to the national interest would be about the same if CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET information were improperly disclosed, the sanctions levied would vary widely depending upon the classification of the document and not upon the degree of damage to the nation.



CIA Member

cc: Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr. - AEC  
Mr. Joseph J. Liebling - Defense  
Mr. William D. Blair, Jr. - State  
Mr. Thomas K. Latimer - NSC



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CONCURRENCES:

STAT

[Redacted Signature Box]

*for* Lawrence R. Houston  
General Counsel

20 Aug 1971  
Date

STAT

[Redacted Signature Box]

John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

20 August 1971  
Date

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Rehnquist  
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SUBJECT : Safeguarding Official Information in the  
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amended)

I referred your memorandum entitled "Department of Justice Submission Relating to Tightening Protection of Classified Documents," dated 5 August 1971 to our Office of General Counsel for review. Their comments are set forth below:

"We have reviewed with considerable interest the memorandum of 5 August 1971 from Mr. William H. Rehnquist to Members of the Interdepartmental Security Review Committee. We too have looked at the British Official Secrets Act over the years to see if we could glean any thoughts which would have application in the United States. As you are well aware, however, one of the big difficulties is that the Official Secrets Act is promulgated in the context of an unwritten constitution and the concept of "crown privilege." If, however, the Official Secrets Act were transposed into U. S. law it undoubtedly would be unconstitutional.

"On the other hand, certain of the objectives which are set forth in the Rehnquist memorandum appear to be not only desirable but feasible. We believe that most of the objectives he mentions, as well as other desirable improvements in U. S. law, will be found in the attached proposed revisions of certain sections of the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code incorporated in the "Final Report of the National

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Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws." These revisions will be transmitted shortly to the Criminal Code Revision Unit, Department of Justice. We have had preliminary discussions with members of that Unit, indicating that we had some concern about certain provisions of the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code.

"In particular, we would like to mention section 1115 of the Proposed Code, which is entitled, "Communication of Classified Information by Public Servant." Basically this section is derived from 50 U. S. C. 783 (b), the statute under which Scarbeck was convicted. Of particular interest is the fact that the District Court held, and the Circuit Court affirmed, that whether the document passed by Scarbeck was properly classified was not an issue to be determined by the court. Consequently, no argument by defense counsel was permitted on this issue.

"For a number of years this Agency has been interested in broadening section 783 (b) to make it a crime not only for a public servant to pass classified information to an agent or representative of a foreign government or to an officer or member of a Communist organization, but also to make it a crime to pass classified information to an "unauthorized person." Language to accomplish this was approved by the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, by letter dated 18 October 1968 to CIA.

"We believe the other revisions which we have proposed would substantially improve existing law as well as retain certain provisions of existing law which were eliminated in the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code."



CIA Member

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Attachment:

Proposed Revisions of the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code

cc: Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr. - AEC  
Mr. Joseph J. Liebling - Defense  
Mr. William D. Blair, Jr. - State  
Mr. Thomas K. Latimer - NSC

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ATT

§109. General Definitions.

(af) "public servant" means an officer or employee of a government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of a government or serving a government as an adviser or consultant. The term includes Members of Congress, members of the state legislatures, Resident Commissioners, judges, ~~and~~ jurors, and members of the military services;

§1112. Espionage.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of espionage if he:

(a) reveals classified national security information to a foreign power or agent thereof with intent that such information be used in a manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States; or

(b) in time of war, elicits, collects or records, or publishes or otherwise communicates classified national security information with intent that it be communicated to the enemy.

(2) Grading. Espionage is a Class A felony if committed in time of war or if the information directly concerns military missiles, space vessels, satellites, nuclear weaponry, early warning systems or other means of defense or retaliation against catastrophic enemy attack, war plans, or any other major element of defense strategy, including ~~security~~ intelligence. Otherwise espionage is a Class B felony.

(3) Attempt and Conspiracy. Attempted espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage are punishable equally with the completed offense. Without limiting the applicability of section 1001 (Criminal Attempt), any of the following acts is sufficient to constitute a substantial step under section 1001 toward commission of espionage under subsection (1)(a): obtaining, collecting, or eliciting classified national security information or entering a restricted area to obtain such information.

(4) Definitions. In this section:

(a) "classified national security information the dissemination of which has been restricted by classification by the President or by the head of a United States Government agency with the approval of the President as affecting the security of the United States regarding:

(i) the military capability of the United States or of a nation at war with a nation with which the United States is at war;

(ii) military or defense planning or operations of the United States;

(iii) military communications, research or development of the United States;

(iv) restricted data as defined in 42 U.S.C. §2014 (relating to atomic energy);

(v) ~~security~~/intelligence of the United States, including information relating to intelligence operations, activities, plans, estimates, analyses, sources and methods;

(vi) ~~classified communications information as defined in~~  
~~section 114~~/in time of war, any other information relating to national ~~defense~~/ security which might be useful to the enemy;

(vii)



(b) "military" connotes land, sea or air military and both offensive and defensive measures;

(c) "foreign power" includes any foreign government, faction, party, or military force, or persons purporting to act as such, whether or not recognized by the United States, any international organization, and any armed insurrection within the United States.

(d) "agent" means representative, officer, agent or employee or, in case of a nation, a subject or citizen.

§1113. Mishandling Classified National Security Information.

A person is guilty of a Class C felony if ~~/ he / reveals / disregards /~~  
~~potential injury to the national security of the United States /~~ he:

(a) knowingly reveals classified national security information  
to anyone not authorized to receive it;

(b) violates a known duty, to which he is subject as a public  
servant, as to custody, care or disposition of classified national  
security information or as to reporting an unlawful removal,  
delivery, loss, destruction, or compromise of the security of  
such information; ~~or~~

(c) ~~knowingly~~ having lawful possession of a document or thing  
containing classified national security information, fails to deliver  
it on demand to a public servant of the United States entitled to  
receive it; or

(d) having unauthorized possession of or control of a document  
or thing containing classified national security information, knowingly  
retains the same and fails to deliver it to a public servant entitled to  
receive it.

"Classified national security information" has the meaning prescribed  
in section 1112(4).

§1114. ~~Disclosure of Classified Communications Intelligence and~~

Disclosure of Classified Communications Intelligence and  
Classified Cryptographic Information.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class ~~/C/~~ A felony if he knowingly:

- (a) communicates classified communications ~~information~~  
intelligence or classified cryptographic information or otherwise  
makes it available to an unauthorized person;
- (b) publishes classified communications ~~information~~  
intelligence or classified cryptographic information; or
- (c) uses classified communications ~~information~~  
intelligence or classified cryptographic information in a manner prejudicial to  
the safety or interest of the United States.

(2) Attempt and Conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy to violate  
this section are punishable equally with the completed offense.

(3) Definitions. In this section:

(a) "communications intelligence or classified cryptographic  
information" means information:

- (i) regarding the nature, preparation or use of any code,  
cipher or cryptographic system of the United States or of a  
foreign power;

(ii) regarding the design, construction, use, maintenance or repair of any device, apparatus or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or a foreign power for cryptographic or intelligence surveillance purposes;

(iii) ~~regarding the intelligence surveillance activities of~~  
~~the United States or a foreign power, or~~ regarding the commu-  
nications intelligence or communications security activities  
of the United States or a foreign power; or

(iv) obtained by the process of communications intelligence  
~~surveillance~~ from the communications of a foreign power;

(b) ~~classified~~ information is "classified" if, at the time the conduct is engaged in, the ~~classified~~ information is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States government agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;

(c) "communications security activity," "code," "cipher" and "cryptographic system" include, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance or means of communications;

(d) "communications intelligence ~~surveillance~~" means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients;

(e) "unauthorized person" means a person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive communications intelligence or classified cryptographic information by the President or by the head of a United States government agency which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communications intelligence ~~surveillance~~ activities for the United States;

(f) "foreign power" has the meaning prescribed in section 1112(4).

(4) Congressional Use. This section shall not apply to the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States or joint committee thereof. Inapplicability under this subsection is a defense.

§1115. Communication of Classified Information by Public Servant.

(1) Offense. A public servant or former public servant is guilty of a Class C felony if he communicates classified information to an agent or representative of a foreign government or to an officer or member of an organization defined in 50 U.S.C. §782(5) (communist organizations) or to an unauthorized person. The term "unauthorized person" means any person or agency not authorized by the President or by the head of a government agency with the approval of the President to receive such classified information. "Classified information" means information the dissemination of which has been restricted by classification by the President or by the head of a United States government agency with the approval of the President as affecting the security of the United States.

(2) Defenses.

(a) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the public servant or former public servant was specifically authorized by the President or by the head of the United States government agency which he served to make the communication prohibited by this section.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the former public servant obtained the information in a manner unrelated to his having been a public servant or, if not so obtained, it was not classified while he was a public servant.

§1130. Injunction Proceedings.

Whenever in the judgment of the head of a government agency any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of sections 1112, 1113, 1114 and 1115, or any regulation or order issued thereunder, the Attorney General on behalf of the United States may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the head of a government agency that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order may be granted.



§1352. False Statements.

(1) False Swearing in Official Proceedings. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if, in an official proceeding, he makes a false statement, whether or not material, under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, if he does not believe the statement to be true.

(2) Other Falsity in Governmental Matters. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if, in a governmental matter, he:

(a) makes a false ~~written~~/statement, ~~when the statement is~~  
~~written~~ and he does not believe it to be true;

(b) intentionally creates a false impression in a written application for a pecuniary or other benefit, by omitting information necessary to prevent a material statement therein from being misleading;

(c) submits or invites reliance on any material writing which he knows to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in authenticity;

(d) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary-mark or other object which he knows to be false in a material respect; or

(e) uses a trick, scheme or device which he knows to be misleading in a material respect.

(3) Statement in Criminal Investigation. This section does not apply to information given during the course of an investigation into possible commission of an offense unless the information is given in an official proceeding or the declarant is otherwise under a legal duty to give the information. Inapplicability under this subsection is a defense.

(4) Definition. A matter is a "governmental matter" if it is within the jurisdiction of a government agency or of an office, agency or other establishment in the legislative or the judicial branch of government.

(5) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in:

(a) subsection (1) when the official proceeding is a federal official proceeding:

(b) subsection (2) when the government is the government of the United States, or when the government is a state or local government and the falsity constituting the offense is that a person is a citizen of the United States.

§1381. Impersonating Officials.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he falsely pretends to be:

- (a) a public servant or foreign official and acts as ~~if he~~  
~~exercises the authority of~~ such ~~public servant or foreign official~~; or
- (b) a public servant or a former public servant or a foreign official and thereby obtains a thing of value.

(2) Defense Precluded. It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the pretended capacity did not exist or the pretended authority could not legally or otherwise have been exercised or conferred.

(3) Definition. In this section "foreign official" means an official of a foreign government of a character which is customarily accredited as such to the United States, the United Nations or the Organization of American States, and includes diplomatic and consular officials.

(4) Grading. An offense under subsection (1)(a) is a Class ~~A~~ B misdemeanor. An offense under subsection (1)(b) is a Class ~~B~~ A misdemeanor.

(5) Jurisdiction.

(a) There is federal jurisdiction over an offense of impersonation of a public servant, present or former, defined in this section when the public servant is a federal public servant.

(b) Federal jurisdiction over an offense of impersonation of a foreign official defined in this section extends to any such offense committed anywhere within the United States or the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction as defined in section 210.

SUBJECT: Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of  
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10501, as amended)

CONCURRENCES:

STAT



*for*  
Lawrence R. Houston  
General Counsel

20 Aug 1971  
Date

STAT



John W. Corley  
Deputy Director  
for Support

20 August 1971  
Date

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Rehnquist  
Chairman, Security Review Committee

SUBJECT : Safeguarding Official Information in the  
Interests of the Defense of the United  
States (Executive Order 10501, as  
amended)

1. I referred Mr. Thomas Latimer's memorandum entitled  
"Draft Revision of Section 7 (b) (3) a." dated August 14, 1971 to our  
Legislative Counsel who commented as follows:

"The first sentence of the proposal poses no  
problem.

"The second sentence of the proposal, which would  
require written permission of the originating agency  
before classified material could be disseminated or  
reproduced by congressional committees, would, for  
all practical purposes, be unenforceable in view of the  
attitude generally prevailing in the Congress. Members  
of Congress have usually insisted upon the right to  
decide for themselves what they should share with their  
fellow members of the Congress and duly cleared staff  
personnel.

"The third sentence in the proposal, which would  
require the return of all classified information to the  
originator within a specified time, appears equally  
unenforceable.

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"Finally, the bulk of classified written material which this Agency provides to congressional committees is for inclusion in the official record of hearings in executive session. This material, upon delivery, becomes the exclusive property of the committee and there is no question of its recovery by the contributing agency.

"An attempt to implement the proposal would very probably produce an adverse and unfortunate reaction on the part of the chairmen, members and staff officials of committees with whom we have contact. It is suggested that the problem be considered at an early session by the Legislative Interdepartmental Group."

2. As this is a particularly sensitive problem it is suggested that before the stringent security restrictions be proposed by the Security Review Committee for Executive Order status, the probable repercussions, as foreseen by the Legislative Interdepartmental Group, be explored.



CIA Member

STAT

cc: Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr. - AEC  
Mr. Joseph J. Liebling - Defense  
Mr. William D. Blair, Jr. - State  
Mr. Thomas K. Latimer - NSC

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CONCURRENCES:

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John M. Maury  
Legislative Counsel

23 Aug 71

Date

STAT



Lawrence R. Houston  
General Counsel

23 Aug 71

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STAT



John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:



FROM:

TOM LATIMER *TL*

SUBJECT:

Draft Revision of Section 7 (b) (3) a.

- a. In the case of classified material disseminated to Congressional committees, only staff members who have been cleared on the request of the chairman of the committee under provisions of \_\_\_\_\_ will be provided access to such material. Such material will be disseminated only on the understanding that it will not receive further reproduction or dissemination without the written approval of the head of the originating department, agency or Governmental unit or his designee. All such material will be returned to the originating office as soon as the Congressional committee no longer has need for such access, that time to be clearly designated in writing on the document at the time it is provided to the committee.